www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org
SummaryThe "2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit", which will be held in Seoul in March 2012, will be the largest summit in the security field that discusses international cooperative measures to protect nuclear materials and facilities from terrorist groups, with participation from more than 53 heads of state and international organizations. The main issues to be discussed at the Summit will be as follows.· Cooperative measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism· Protection of nuclear materials and related facilities· Prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materialsBackgroundBasic ObjetivesThe possibility of nuclear terrorism became a real threat after 9/11, which increased the importance of strengthening nuclear security to prevent nuclear materials from being misused by terrorist groups. There is a need to recognize the importance of nuclear security at the summit level and seek cooperation, as the threat of nuclear terrorism cannot be addressed by a single nation.
President Obama stated in his 2009 Prague speech that nuclear terrorism is a serious threat to international security, and expressed his will to lead global efforts to protect nuclear materials as part of his plan to realize his vision of a "world free of nuclear weapons."
The first Nuclear Security Summit, the largest international meeting relating to the nuclear issue, was held in Washington in April 2010. The summit was attended by leaders from 47 states and 3 international organizations (UN, EU, IAEA), including the P5 nations (nuclear weapons states) and states not party to the NPT, such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. The leaders discussed plans to strengthen nuclear security by preventing the misuse of nuclear materials by non-state actors.
The Republic of Korea, as host of the second Nuclear Security Summit to be held in March 2012, will play a leading role in coordinating participating countries' views on key nuclear security issues and lead discussions on the drafting of the 'Seoul Communiqué,' which will be the final document of the Seoul Summit.
The selection of Korea as host of the 2012 Summit reflects the international community's recognition of its world-class nuclear technology, its compliance with NPT obligations and its exemplary use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The hosting of the Nuclear Security Summit on the Korean peninsula will be highly significant given its implications within the context of denuclearization. The Significance of the Hosting of the Summit in SeoulKorea has established its status as an advanced country by securing the hosting of a whole range of international meetings in the economic, cultural, and sports fields including the hosting of the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit. The holding of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit means that Korea has gained even greater standing in the international community in the security field as well. In addition, it is meaningful that Korea will play a leading role in establishing global governance in the security and political fields just as it played a significant role in the economic field through the hosting of the 2010 G20 Seoul Summit.ParticipantsHeads of 53 states which participated in the 1st Washington Nuclear Security Summit. (Republic of Korea, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, UAE, UK, Ukraine, USA, Vietnam).Heads of international organizations which participated in the Washington Summit (the UN, IAEA, and EU).INTERPOL was added to the group of participants as agreed upon between the participating countries and international organizations. .
About NSS
Nuclear Security Summit1) BackgroundWhat is nuclear security?Nuclear security is a series of preemptive measures introduced to prevent internal and/or external threats directly or indirectly related to nuclear materials, radioactive substances, relevant facilities or other associated activities. In the case of imminent threat, it consists of countermeasures to detect, delay and prevent illegal acts, as well as administrative and technical measures to minimize the damage caused by accidents.Historic milestones in the evolution of the nuclear security issueIn the late 1960s, cross-border transfers of nuclear materials increased with the rising use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Nuclear security aimed to ensure the stability in the supply of nuclear fuel by preventing the illegal seizure of nuclear materials in transit.Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, managing existing nuclear materials and facilities within the former Soviet territory emerged as a priority issue, with an emphasis on disarmament and on the protection of and the reduction in the number of nuclear materials and facilities.Following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the possibility of terrorists misusing nuclear materials and facilities became a real threat, and nuclear security was highlighted as a means to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism. 2) 2010 Washington Nuclear Security SummitBackgroundPresident Obama proposed to hold a Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 in his Prague speech on April 5, 2009, and officially announced his plans to host the Summit at the G-8 Summit that was held in July 2009.References to nuclear security in President Obama's Prague speech on April 5, 2009.Singled out nuclear terrorism as the most serious threat to international security.
Announced his plan to lead a global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world in four years.
Announced his plan to hold a Nuclear Security Summit in the year 2010.Goals of the SummitThe Summit aimed to seek joint response measures and ways to cooperate to strengthen nuclear security, based on a shared recognition at the highest level of its importance.As the Summit focused on nuclear security, the aspects of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were not addressed.The Washington Communiqué containing political pledges at the Summit level and the Work Plan containing specific technical measures were adopted as final documents.Outcomes of the SummitLeaders agreed on the urgency and seriousness of the threat.Participating States agreed to work towards the goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world.Participating States reaffirmed the fundamental responsibility of nations, consistant with their international obligations, to maintain effective security of the nuclear materials and facilities under their control.Participating States agreed to work cooperatively as an international community to advance nuclear security, requesting and providing assistance as necessary.
Joint Statement on the Contributions of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) to Enhancing Nuclear Security
21 March 2012
We, the Co-Chairs (Russia and the United States) of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), the Implementation and Assessment Group (IAG) Coordinator (Spain), and leaders of the three IAG Working Groups (the Kingdom of Morocco, the Netherlands and Australia) wish to inform the states in attendance at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit of the valuable contributions the GICNT has made in strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.
In 2010, the Russian and U.S. Co-Chairs embarked on a process to streamline GICNT activities so that they directly advance key nuclear security goals and the GICNT Statement of Principles, which were adopted at the first GICNT Plenary Meeting in 2006 in Rabat, Morocco. As a result, the partnership implemented the IAG mechanism to better coordinate and focus GICNT activities. The June 2010 Abu Dhabi GICNT Plenary Meeting endorsed Spain to lead the IAG. In Abu Dhabi, the partnership also agreed to direct future activities in the focus areas of nuclear detection and nuclear forensics, two topics of global importance that were highlighted at the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit; the Netherlands and Australia currently lead GICNT working groups on these topics, respectively. In June 2011, the Daejeon GICNT Plenary Meeting added response and mitigation as a third focus area and endorsed the Kingdom of Morocco to lead a working group on this issue.The GICNT's technical IAG program was launched in February 2011 at the first IAG Mid-Year Meeting in Cordoba, Spain. The Cordoba IAG Meeting laid the foundation for the development of practical guidance documents and the organization of exercises and seminars in 2011 by partner nations Morocco, Australia, and the United Kingdom. All of these activities were designed to assist partner nations to enhance their capabilities. In the outreach field, Morocco organized a GICNT Outreach Seminar for 26 African states in Rabat (November 2011). Most recently, partner nations gathered at the Second IAG Mid-Year Meeting, held in Marrakech, Morocco from 13 to 16 February 2012, to finalize the first IAG documents and advance working group plans for the coming year. Over 200 GICNT partner nation experts and representatives from all four GICNT official observers (the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the European Union (EU), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)) participated in both the Cordoba and Marrakech IAG Meetings. This robust participation demonstrates the vital importance that GICNT partner nations place on enhancing nuclear security and underscores their desire to work cooperatively to further this goal.
The collaborative efforts fostered by the GICNT are especially significant in light of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit and the upcoming Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Already, GICNT collaboration has produced important results that complement the Nuclear Security Summit process and help advance critical elements addressed in the Summit:> The Nuclear Detection Working Group, chaired by the Netherlands, is developing a series of guidance documents focused on developing and/or enhancing nuclear and radiological detection efforts. The first document in the series, the "Model Guidelines Document for Nuclear Detection Architectures," serves as a foundational strategic
framework for developing and implementing an effective national-level detection architecture. The second document in the series entitled, "Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture: Guidelines for Awareness, Training and Exercises" focuses on a methodology for developing and implementing effective awareness, training and exercise mechanisms essential for raising awareness at all levels of detection architecture implementation, maintaining proficiency on skills that support the detection of nuclear and radioactive materials, and exercising the relevant people and capabilities as key elements for successful detection. This document focuses on key principles and considerations for implementing and enhancing five cross-cutting elements: awareness, training, exercises (AT&E), evaluation, and sustainability. The Working Group developed this document through an iterative process using interactive web-based collaboration tools and an in-person comprehensive October 2011 review meeting in Zadar, Croatia. Discussions in Marrakech, Morocco in February 2012 launched the collaborative development of the Working Group's third document in the Developing a Nuclear Detection Architecture series focused on the Planning and Organization required for implementing an effective detection architecture.> The Nuclear Forensics Working Group, chaired by Australia, completed a document entitled, "Nuclear Forensics . "Fundamentals for Policy Makers and Decision Makers." This document is intended to raise policy maker and decision maker awareness of nuclear forensics as a tool to enhance nuclear material security and to prevent illicit uses of nuclear and other radioactive material. This document also seeks to foster cooperation among governments and assists in identifying capabilities in which investments should be considered. Early in the drafting process, the Working Group partnered with the European Union's Joint Research Centre for a May 2011 Nuclear Forensics Seminar and Tabletop Exercise in Karlsruhe, Germany focused on policy issues pertaining to technical capabilities and information sharing. This activity allowed partner nations to identify challenges and opportunities in addressing capability gaps, implementing practical frameworks for international engagements, and developing effective methods of information sharing.> The Response and Mitigation Working Group, chaired by Morocco, is the newest GICNT working group and initiated its work at the recent February 2012 Marrakech Mid-Year IAG Meeting. The Working Group agreed upon a Scope Document that focuses its activities on collaborative development of best practices and capacity building to strengthen national emergency response frameworks in the event of a malicious act involving nuclear and other radioactive material. The overall objective of the Working Group is to develop a comprehensive guide on how a nation with limited capabilities could go about establishing and building a robust capability.Looking to the future, the GICNT Co-Chairs, the IAG Coordinator and the Working Group Leaders remain committed to working with GICNT partner nations to pursue focused efforts and activities that foster nuclear security collaboration, advance nuclear security goals, and complement the objectives of the Nuclear Security Summit. ............................................................
2012 Seoul Nuclear Security SummitBeyond security towards peacewww.thenuclearsecuritysummit.orgRelated LinksAmong others:Washington Nuclear Security SummitU.S. Department of StateDiplomacy in Action
The Basics of Nuclear Security Nuclear Security 101 Fact SheetBureau of International Security and NonproliferationMarch 21, 2012 The goal of United States Government's nuclear security programs is the prevention of the illegal possession, use or transfer of nuclear material or other radioactive material. Successful nuclear security relies on an interconnected combination of technology, policy, operational concepts and international collaboration to prevent acts of nuclear terrorism.The Basics of Nuclear Security include:· Removing or Eliminating Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium. Only when nuclear material is completely removed from a site is the threat of nuclear theft completely eliminated because the removal results in permanent threat reduction. HEU and separated plutonium removal and/or disposition is an important effort in securing vulnerable nuclear material worldwide. Twenty-eight nations have plans to eliminate all current stocks of HEU by the end of 2013. · Upgrading security measures, including physical protection, material control and accounting, at nuclear material and warhead sites around the world to prevent the loss or theft of nuclear material. · Converting civilian commercial reactors and isotope production facilities to use Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) fuel and targets to reduce global reliance on HEU for research, energy and medical isotopes. Reducing the amount of WMD-usable HEU in the civilian fuel cycle minimizes the threat of nuclear terrorism. · Deploying radiation detection capabilities, as well as providing training and sustainability support, at high-risk land, sea and air border crossings and strategic locations to provide a backstop to the nuclear site security systems and increases the likelihood that stolen nuclear material will be detected and seized. · Formulating and implementing international and domestic nuclear nonproliferation strategies, policies, and treaties to combat nuclear terrorism along with international partners. · Advancing technologies to detect and characterize foreign nuclear weapons programs through continued research and development in the field. Diverting special nuclear materials, strengthening verification and monitoring capabilities for nuclear arms control treaties, and enhancing global nuclear security. · Advancing nuclear forensics capabilities to trace the origin of seized materials or devices, help identify smuggling networks and aid prosecution efforts of such illicit trafficking, pinpoint vulnerabilities in security measures to ensure nuclear and other radioactive materials remain secured, and build and harmonize foreign nuclear forensics capabilities. Nuclear Security vs. Nuclear Safety: Nuclear security pertains to the prevention of nuclear material theft, nuclear smuggling and terrorism while nuclear safety deals with the practices and safeguards to keep nuclear facilities and workers safe.
